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A NOTE ON CONCENTRATION STUDIES
AND ANTITRUST POLICY
JESSE W. MARKHAM*
INTRODUCTION

The current interest in industrial concentration studies almost
rivals that which gave rise to the Temporary National Economic Committee's voluminous output on the subject two decades ago. Indeed,
by almost any standard, 1957 was a banner year. The Federal Trade
Commission opened the season with its 656-page report in January.'
The National Industrial Conference Board devoted a session to the
topic at its forty-first annual meeting in May. 2 In July the Bureau of
the Census published its study performed at the request of the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly.3 In June the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States issued its first in a projected series
of reports on the measurement of concentration; the second followed in
July;4 others are still to come. Meanwhile, the output of economists
in the professional journals has continued apace.
But the recent literature on concentration differs significantly from
the earlier studies. Gardiner C. Means, who is often credited with
having inaugurated the systematic study of concentration with his
1931 article,5 set the tune for much that was to follow: "within 'the
corporate system' there exists a centripetal attraction which draws
wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size . . .
the trend is apparent, and no limit is yet in sight."6 The Federal
Trade Commission was still echoing the same tune seventeen years
later: "If nothing is done to check the growth in concentration either
the giant corporations will ultimately take over the country, or the
government will be impelled to step in ...."1
True, not all studies of this period reached such sweeping and impassioned conclusions. The more cautious report by Willard W.
* Professor of Economics, Princeton University.
1. FTC, REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION
IN THE 1000 LARGEST MANUFACTURING COMIPANIES (1957).
2. The proceedings of the conference were published under the title Eco-

NOIC CONCENTRATION MEASURES: USES AND ABUSES, STUDIES IN BUSINESS
ECONOiVIcs No. 57 (1957).
3. U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE STUDY
OF THE PROPORTION OF SHIPMENTS (OR EMPLOYEES) OF EACH INDUSTRY,
OR THE SHIPMENTS OF EACH GROUP OF PRODUCTS ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE LARGEST
COM"ANIES AS REPORTED nT THE 1954 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS, (1957).
4. U. S. CHAIVIBER OF COMMIERCE, REPORTS ON THE MEASUREMENT OF EcoNOIC CONCENTRATION, No. 1, 2 (1957).
5. MEANS, The Large Corporationin American Economic Life, 21 Am. EcoN.
REV. 10 (1931).
6. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 40 (1932).
7. FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT 28 (1948).
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Thorp and Walter F. Crowder in 1941 pointed out that concentration
in American manufacturing "showed no uniform dominating trend.
Positions of dominance once achieved were not always maintained."8
It is also true that the more foreboding estimates of concentration,
and the inferences drawn from them, did not pass unchallenged.
Some, notably. Edwin B. George, called for more cautious interpretations.9 Others, as had Thorp and Crowder earlier,10 argued that the
problem of monopoly must be distinguished from that of size. But the
dominant tone of the day was clear: Concentration was high and on
the increase. So was monopoly. These were the statistical facts
which only pedants were likely to debate.
The debate was fruitful, and not confined to pedants. Subsequent
studies by Morris A. Adelman and G. Warren Nutter not only challenged the statistical bases on which earlier conclusions rested, they
offered data supporting different conclusions. Adelman concluded that
concentration was indeed high, but had shown no tendency over the
years to increase, and had possibly declined." Nutter, using industry
concentration data, concluded that monopoly may well have declined
between 1899 and 1939.12 Such studies are appropriately regarded as
important landmarks in the broad sweep of the literature. They highlighted significant gaps and inadequacies in concentration data, served
to caution researchers against extravagant policy-oriented conclusions,
and provided a more useful analytical frame of reference for the study
of industrial concentration generally. Few who disagreed with Adelman's and Nutter's own conclusions on trends in concentration and
monopoly-and some did' 3-questioned the value of their works.
They were methodical, factual studies in an area where surmise and
conjecture had often been confused with fact.
8. THORP. & CROWDER, THE STucTuPE OF INDUSTRY 8 (TNEC Monograph No.
27, 1941).
9. George, How Big is Big Business, Dun's Review, March 1939; George,
Is Big Business Getting Bigger, id., May 1939; George, How Did Big Business
Get Big, id., Sept., 1939.
10. See note 8 supra.
11. Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, Review of

Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1951, pp. 269-96.

12. NUTTER, THE EXTENT OF ENTERPRISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES 1899-

1939 (1951).
13. See Edwards, Stocking, George & Berle, Four Comments in "Measurement of Industrial Concentration": with a Rejoinder by Professor Adelman,
Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1952, pp. 156-78. But commentors
who differed with Adelman applauded his efforts: Professor Corwin D. Edwards welcomed the study as a "pioneering effort." Id. at 156. Professor
George Stocking recognized Adelman's treatment of conceptual problems as
"a thoughtful, discriminating analysis, important to any student of industrial
concentration." Id. at 161. Edwin B. George found "his constructive presentation ... in general excellent and . . . not open to serious criticism at vital
points." Id. at 168. Professor A. A. Berle, Jr., found "Adelman's capable and
thorough-going review

. . .

a major contribution." Id. at 172. Adelman had

already characterized '"utter's contribution [as] one of the most important
in recent years." Adelman, supra note 11, at 290.
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But to plead for more cautious calculation and interpretation of
concentration measurements is one thing; to argue that such measurements are virtually useless is another. Some of the more recent assessments of concentration studies have come dangerously close to suggesting that concentration measures are so fraught with statistical
and conceptual ambiguities that they are a worthless analytical device.
Thus the Chamber of Commerce recently found little difficulty in
gleaning from the current literature citations of no less than a score
14
of prominent economists and statisticians in support of this view.
In brief, to use the words of the late Professor Schumpeter, it how
appears that we are prepared "to throw the baby out with the bath
water." It is the contention of this short essay that while the water
may need purifying-perhaps a complete change-antitrust law administration can scarcely do without the baby.
THE MEASUREMENT AND MEANING
OF ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
Inquiry into economic concentration has developed two broad types
of measures: aggregative indices of concentration purporting to show
the extent to which control over corporate (or other) wealth is
centralized; and partial, or particular, indices designed to show the
degree of market control over a line of commerce possessed by a given
number of firms. The first of these-made familiar by Berle and
Means's-is generally expressed as the ratio of the assets (employment, sales, etc.) of the largest 50, 100, 200, 500, . . . , 1000 corporations
to total assets (employment, sales, etc.); the second is the share of the
output (employment, assets, sales, etc.) of a particular industry accounted for by the largest 4, 8, 12, . . ., 50 producers. For some purposes-the design of tax policy comes first to mind-aggregative
indices of concentration may be quite useful, but they clearly have
16
little to do with the monopoly problem and antitrust policy. The
economic theory of monopoly is confined to partial equilibrium
analysis, and the antitrust laws, as will be emphasized below, to particular lines of commerce. Aggregative concentration indices no more
indicate levels of concentration in particular markets-the degree of
oligopoly-than indices of the net national product indicate its composition.17 Because they are conceptually inapplicable to problems of
CHAMVBER OF COMMTERCE, op. cit. supra note 4.
15. Berle &Means, op. cit. supra note 6.

14. U. S.

16. Cf. the author's comment in NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION MEASURES:

USES AND ABUSES,

STUDIES IN BusINEss Eco-

NOMICS No. 57, at 19 (1957).
17. This all too obvious fact has sometimes been ignored, thereby creating
considerable confusion.

For a

succinct statement designed to clarify the

issue see Adelman, supra note 11, at 269.
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antitrust a recounting of their technical deficiencies here serves no
useful purpose.
BeforeF turning to measures of concentration for particular markets
certain aspects of the antitrust laws themselves merit brief review.
In b6th legislative and judicial construction the antitrust statutes
focus on particular lines of commerce. This is made most explicit in
section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits the acquisition by one
corporation of the stock or assets of another corporation,
Where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly.'8 (Emphasis added.)
What congress made explicit in section 7 with "any line of commerce"
it made implicit there and in the Sherman Act with "competition,"
"monopoly," "restraint of trade" and "any part of trade."'19 The lessening of competition and the creation of monopoly occur in particular
markets and relate to specific products.
But the antitrust laws not only focus on particular lines of commerce, their administration must necessarily contemplate the market
position or commercial practices of particular business firms. The
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission do not
initiate action against the "X industry" or the "Y sector of the economy;", they must name specific defendants and respondents. High or
increasing concentration in an industry is not itself actionable under
section 7 of the Clayton Act or the Sherman Act, the two statutes
most directly involving industrial structure, but rather the actions of
particular firms which may or may not affect concentration in their
respective industries. But it is emphasized that firms generally are
not guilty of any antitrust violation simply because the concentration
ratios for their respective industries are rising, or innocent because
they are declining. The connection between measures of industrial
concentration and antitrust law administration is much less direct.
It is not to be inferred from this, however, that measures of industrial concentration, e.g., the familiar concentration ratio, 20 are virtually irrelevant to the antitrust problem. The shortcomings of the
existing data notwithstanding, 21 they are indispensible to the screening
of possible antitrust law infractions. In spite of all that has been said
about the need for thorough investigation of all the economic facts,
for consideration of .many factors other than the market shares involved, and for reasonable rather than per se rules, concentration
18. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
19. 20 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1952).

20. The share of an industry, measured in terms of sales, assets, employment, capacity, etc., accounted for by the four largest producers.
21. See page 337 infra.
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data permit the use of certain loosely defined labor-saving per se rules
of conduct. Within antitrust agencies any merger in an industry
having a concentration ratio as low as, say, .10 is likely to be dismissed
out of hand as within the permissible limits of section 7; and whatever may be the business practices of a firm in such an industry they
are not likely to be pursued under the Sherman Act. Let the events
be the same but change the concentration index to 1.00 and the
outcome will very likely be reversed. Most antitrust cases emerge
from the "gray" area of the law-where the government and legal
counsel for the firms involved hold different views concerning acts
the law prohibits. But the history of antitrust policy suggests that
the area of agreement between the government and private counsel is
much greater than the area of doubt. While many factors contribute
to this state of affairs, quantitative measurements, if for no other reason than that they are quantitative, have surely played a major role.
It is not fortuitous that several hundred mergers involving the top
half-dozen firms have occurred in the textile industry, where concentration is low, without precipitating a single section 7 case, or that no
mergers have occurred between major automobile, petroleum refining,
22
or aluminum companies-industries where concentration is high.
Mergers such as these lie outside the "gray" area, and largely because
both government and private businesses know the probable outcome
of cases involving very large and very small market shares.
We turn now to the more important use of concentration measures,
their value as evidence in litigating antitrust cases. Concentration
indices are essentially an arithmetical description of the share of a
market occupied by the largest sellers. They take their values from
two variables: the number and the relative size of the firms accounted
for in the numerator. A complete set of concentration indices would
proceed from the largest to the smallest firm in an arithmetical progression of one, and yield the share of the market occupied by the
largest 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, sellers. 23 When a small number of firms yields
a high index, concentration is said to be high; when they yield a low
index concentration is low. A high concentration index shows that
a few large firms account for a large share of the market, i.e., it is a
quantitative measure of oligopoly.
In economics the term oligopoly is not, as sometimes alleged, a word
of art; it translates into a pattern of business behavior. The extent
to which firms in a given industry engage in price competition is likely
22. The Bethlehem-Youngstown merger prevents the inclusion of the steel
industry, where concentration is also high. But it is not irrelevant that
nearly two years of consultation between the Department of Justice and
Bethlehem preceded the agreement to disagree.
23. Those calculated from census data must start with at least four frms
because data for a smaller number cannot be disclosed.
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to be affected very much by how many firms there are. When many
sellers offer goods in the same market, and no one of them accounts
for much of the total sales volume, they are likely to try to increase
sales by offering buyers price incentives. Each seller does this because
any increase in his sales resulting from such a price incentive is spread
over many rivals, no one of which is so seriously affected that it must
immediately meet the price. Hence, when sellers are numerous, prices
are likely to be competitive-they will approximate costs, including
competitive profits. But when sellers are few in number, or when a
few sellers account for most of the sales, they are likely to reason
differently. A price reduction by one that leads to a significant reduction in the sales of another cannot be expected to go unnoticed, and
each firm knows this and acts accordingly. Hence, the price prevailing
in the market is not necessarily a competitive price, and it very likely
will contain an element of monopoly reward.24 Because high concentration indices generally reflect the market structure of oligopoly,
they signal the probable oligopolistic market behavior. That is, the
probability that prices will not be those competition would establish.
How useful then are concentration measures in the litigation of
antitrust cases involving monopoly, or market power? Before even
a tentative answer can be given to this question it obviously must be
made clear what specific type and source of concentration data one has
in mind. Much of the recent lamentation over the inadequacies of
concentration data has not with sufficient clarity distinguished between
the definitional and statistical short-comings of past concentration
studies and the extent to which concentration measures can appropriately indicate market power. Thus the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, after citing nine prominent authorities on the subject, could without serious injustice to the main thrust of their composite argument conclude:
The fact that concentration ratios are conceptually invalid as measures of
industrial concentration or market power has been established with
abundant clarity by the authorities that have been cited.25 (Emphasis
added.)
The Chamber then relies on Dean Edward S. Mason for the final word:
That market power is an elusive quality requires no demonstration ...
it is not possible, nor will it ever be possible, by calculating market
shares ... or other hocus pocus, to present an unambiguous measure of
the degree of monopoly.26
24. All this was set forth more than twenty-five years ago by E. H. Chamber-

lin. CHAMBERiaN, THE THEORY OF MONOOtasTIc COMPETITION, c. III (1933).
25. U. S. CHAIIBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE MEASUREMENT OF EcoNOIV4IC CONCENTRATION No. 1, at 8 (1957).

26. Ibid., citing Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Com-

ments, 46 Am. EcoN. REV. 480 (1956).
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Thus is the circle of reasoning closed: concentration data suffer from
definitional and statistical ambiguities, hence market shares are ambiguous measures of the degree of monopoly power. But the Chamber
overlooked the real import of Dean Mason's observation, which followed with:
Nevertheless it should be equally obvious that judgments concerning the
extent of market power are made in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
and must be made unless we are willing to scrap this legislation in favor
of an altogether different approach. 27
How much error concentration data generally contain is therefore
not the essential question, but rather what weight should reasonably
be assigned market shares in deciding antitrust cases under statutes
involving market power. Much of the recent critical appraisal of
concentration studies is irrelevant to this issue, and has, I believe,
inadvertently tended seriously to understate the extent to which
market power can be inferred from market shares.
What some of the recent critics seem to have overlooked is that the
world of antitrust law administration is not the world of general
concentration studies, and hence that much which may be entirely
valid criticism for one does not necessarily hold for the other. Students
of concentration work with the tools they have. These tools are often
highly imprecise instruments. The Bureau of the Census industry
classifications often do not conform to those which are relevant for
economic analysis; even for these classifications data on less than four
firms cannot be disclosed; the data do not allow for important shifts
among the top firms; the computed concentration ratios make no
allowance for the dynamic forces at work in the industry, or for the
various stages of the industry's development; and sales, output, and
employment data for existing firms tell us nothing of market shares
including potential producers. 28 Concentration data, or more specifically, the market shares of producers, can clearly be ambiguous and
imprecise.
These, however, are not the data with which antitrust agencies deal.
The Federal Trade Commission makes extensive use of letters of inquiry, the subpoena, and often conducts its own market surveys. The
Department of Justice can avail itself of grand jury proceedings and
interrogatories. Through these instruments the relevant market the
case involves can be given considerable refinement, substitutes can
27. Ibid.
28. For competent and scholarly discussions of these deficiencies in concentration data see comments by Kaysen, Scitovsky, Fellner, Miller, Rosenbluth,
Herfindahl & Bain in NATIONAL BuREAu or EcoNoMIc RESEARCH, BusINEss
CONCENTRATION AN PRICE POLICIES 57-140 (1955). See also Edwards, id. at
334; Adelman, supra note 11, at 271-74; Mason, supra note 25, at 480.
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be identified, the market shares of defendants ascertained, the dynamic
forces at work in the industry assessed, and it is not unlikely that defendants will reveal sources of actual and potential competition and
can be relied upon to present in evidence market shares of their
own. All this may not produce market shares of watch-like precision, but those laid before the judge will have undergone considerable purification.
CONCLUSION

The course of antitrust has been erratic and unpredictable. But
one of the discernible trends in recent years has been toward laying
considerable stress on the relevant market and the defendant's market
share. These issues loomed large in the Aluminum,29 American To-

bacco, 30 DuPont Cellophane,31 Dupont-General Motors,32 and United

Shoe Machinery33 cases, and are now highlighted in some thirty-three
pending section 7 proceedings. 34 Factors other than these condition
antitrust decisions, and no doubt will continue to do so. With this
there should be no major quarrel. But economics relies heavily on the
structural aspects of the market to differentiate among the various

degrees of monopoly and competition. The Sherman Act and section
7 of the Clayton Act are cast in this economic language, and for
decades both have stood in need of quantitative policy guides. It would
therefore seem to follow that shares of the market in the hands of
respondents are highly relevant to ascertaining monopoly and tendencies toward it. Calculations of such shares will always be affected
by the judgment of those who calculate them, and hence will be subject to debate. But I seriously doubt that judgments on the dynamic
aspects of the industry, the role of potential competitors, the state of
business rivalry, and other such market facts will be any less so.
29. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir.

1945).

30.
31.
32.
33.

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.

Mass. 1953), affd per curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
34. Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal,43 VA. L. REV. 489 (1957).

